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INTRODUCTION
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B parties to meet their commitments under the Protocol by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading so long as such trading is ÒsupplementalÓ to domestic emissions control. Supplementarity in this context refers to the level of imports of tradable emissions permits relative to abatement undertaken domestically.
The language of Article 17 clearly prohibits any party from relying entirely upon imported permits to meet its commitment, but this limiting case is implausible. Each party faces a schedule of identifiable GHG abatement opportunities, ranging in costs from near-zero to very high, and it is reasonable to assume that parties would utilize these opportunities in a cost-effective manner. Since every party would undertake some cheap domestic abatement, further elaboration of the meaning of the supplemental provisions of the Kyoto Protocol could be deemed unnecessary. 1 Ellerman is executive director of the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change and senior lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Sue Wing is a candidate for the Ph.D. in Technology, Management and Policy at MIT and a research assistant with the Joint Program. We are greatly endebted to Matti Vainio, Peter Zapfel, John Reilly, Erik Haites, and Henry Tulkens for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. None are responsible for remaining errors. We also gratefully acknowledge Henry TulkensÕ role in convening the session at the 1999 annual meeting of the European Economic Association in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, which provided the initial impetus for the paper. Funding for the research underlying this paper was provided by the corporate and government sponsors of MITÕs Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, including particularly in this instance EPRI. As always, much credit is due our colleagues in the Joint Program, who have been a continual source of stimulation.
Indeed, the Umbrella Group, consisting of Annex B parties that are not members of the European Union (EU), have adopted this interpretation; however, the EU and its members maintain that something more is required: an explicit quantitative limit, commonly referred to as a Òconcrete ceiling.Ó To this end, the EU advanced a specific proposal to implement the supplemental provisions of the Kyoto Protocol at the June 1999 meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies in Bonn. This paper analyzes the effects of a limit on permit imports under the usual analytic assumptions: namely, that all Annex B parties meet their Kyoto Protocol obligations and that free trade in permits among these parties is a realistic possibility. The paper proceeds in two parts. First, we address an aspect of supplementarity about which previous analyses have been remarkably silent: the inherently monopsonistic effects of a restriction 2 on permit imports. Then, we present and explain the EU proposal, which is more complicated than the simple quantitative limits that have been analyzed in earlier studies. In particular, we examine how various provisions of the EU proposal affect the efficiency and equity attributes of emissions trading in an Annex B market. A final section concludes, and a mathematical appendix presents proofs for the essential points made in the body of the paper.
THE MONOPSONISTIC EFFECTS OF SUPPLEMENTARITY
A number of studies have examined the effect of restricting permit imports, 3 and they present broadly similar conclusions, namely, ¥ Misallocation of resources that increases the global cost of compliance with the Kyoto target, ¥ Reduction in the gains from emissions trading for exporters of permits, and ¥ Reduction in the cost of meeting importersÕ emissions-control obligations for some levels of restriction.
The last point is an important one; however, several studies missed it entirely (Ellerman and Decaux, and Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux) , and others observed the effect without drawing the full implications. Both Bernstein et al. and Bollen et al. note the irony of results they obtain in which the US, which opposes such restriction, is made better off by it, while the EU, which advocates such restriction, benefits less or not at all. Criqui et al. produce results indicating that all importers of tradable permits gain for some level of restriction. They describe a U-shaped curve whereby the total cost for importers declines initially, as an import restriction of increasing severity is imposed, and then rises until it reaches the higher cost level associated with autarky.
These results describe the effects of monopsony, yet surprisingly none of these studies recognize that the implementation of supplementarity implies an exercise of monopsonistic power. Bernstein et al. dismiss their result as accidental (Òvery sensitive to assumptions about baselines and a variety of elasticities and other parameters,Ó p. 247) and they stress that it should not be taken Òas a strong guide to policy.Ó Criqui et al. correctly identify the effects as a more general consequence of implementing restrictions, but cloud this central insight with a discussion of compensation of exporters. Bollen et al. mention monopsony, only to dismiss the possibility by arguing that Òrestrictions are not the result of monopsonistic optimizing behavior,Ó as if intent were all that mattered. Other studies have discussed the potential exercise of market power in permit markets, but the focus has always been on the relation of that potential to the initial allocation of permits. 4 None have pointed out that a concrete ceiling provides a coordinating mechanism for restricting demand that could be as effective as overt collusion among buyers or the exercise of market power by a significant importer.
Monopsonistic effects are illustrated most easily by assuming a competitive market in which all agents are price takers. Such a market structure would be more likely to obtain if Annex B partiesÕ assigned amounts were downloaded to agents within each economy and those agents were free to trade within or across borders. With no restrictions on emissions trading, a free-trade equilibrium would obtain in which the marginal costs of abatement would be equalized across sources, the global cost of compliance would be minimized, and the gains from trade maximized.
Any effective restriction on permit imports will change total cost for the restricted party, as well as for other market participants, and that change can be illustrated by the following differential. dTC f a p da m dp
For a party i, dTC i is the change in the total cost of emissions reduction, which may be achieved by undertaking abatement a i (a small change in which is written da i ) or importing permits m i . The ith partyÕs marginal cost of domestic emissions control is determined by a marginal abatement cost function f i (a i ), and it purchases emissions allowances in the market at price p (a small change in which is written dp).
The change in total cost of abatement depends on two effects. The first term on the right-hand side describes the net change in domestic abatement cost and the second term describes the change in the cost of imports. For any party that is restricted from its free trade equilibrium, domestic abatement and the marginal cost of domestic control both increase. As a result, the first term on the right hand side is positive. Appendix A1 shows that a binding restriction on any partyÕs imports will reduce the total demand for permits and thereby the market price of permits, so long as all other parties remain price-takers and face upward sloping marginal abatement cost curves. The second term is therefore negative and the net impact of the import restriction on total cost depends on the balance between these two terms. As illustrated graphically in Figure 1 , the restricted importer gains whenever the deadweight loss triangle ABC is less than the rectangle CDEF, which represents the cost saving in remaining imports. 4 For examples, see Westskog (1996) ; Bohm and Larsen (1994); and Baron (1999) . 5 Note that the difference between domestic marginal cost and the market price for remaining permit imports will create a rent that must be allocated in some manner.
Increasing the stringency of the import restriction from nonbinding to autarky gives rise first to a net saving, which increases before it declines and eventually disappears as rising domestic abatement costs overwhelm the savings on import costs, as illustrated in Figure 2 . This sequence reflects the evolution of the cost-saving and deadweight loss components discussed more fully in Appendix A3. With Figure 1 . Effect of Import Limit on Restricted Importer convex marginal abatement curves the internal deadweight loss increases monotonically as the restriction is tightened. As long as any permits are imported, the lower import price generates cost savings that offset the internal deadweight loss. These savings increase initially and then decline to zero as the autarkic limit is approached. The heavy line shows the net effect on the total cost of compliance. Net savings are maximized at a r *, and any restriction up to the point a r ** will reduce importersÕ total cost of abatement relative to free trade. The differential in equation (1) can also be used to explain the consequences of import restrictions for unrestricted importers and exporters. Since internal marginal abatement cost will equal the market price of permits for these parties, the first right-hand-side term is zero. Consequently, the effect of the import restriction is determined by the last term on the right-handside. For unrestricted importers (m i > 0) total cost is reduced, while for exporters (m i < 0) the negative cost (or benefit from trade) is diminished. For discrete changes in price and abatement, the effect on unrestricted importers is illustrated in FigureÊ3a. The cheaper price for permits leads these parties to import more and they gain both by the reduction in price for the previous level of imports and by the additional savings from displaced domestic abatement. AnÊunrestricted importer is the demand-side equivalent of a non-cooperative fringe producer that produces more at the higher price maintained by a dominant monopolist. In this context, unrestricted importers buy more and bid the price up somewhat, thereby diminishing the price-depressing effects of the supplementarity limit, as demonstrated in Appendix A2. Figure 3b illustrates the case of the price-taking exporter. The net reduction in demand for imported permits causes the price to fall and exporters to abate less (da). Exporters lose by the amount, ABFCD, most of which (ABCD) is an income transfer to importers. The small triangle, CEF, represents the global deadweight loss on the exportersÕ side of the market, and there will be a corresponding deadweight loss on the importersÕ side of approximately equal magnitude. ForÊimport restrictions that are not too stringent, it is easy to see that the magnitude of the income transfer will be far larger than the global deadweight loss. Nevertheless, as the restriction binds more tightly, the deadweight loss on both sides of the permit market increases until this effect overwhelms the income transfer. An interesting point is reached when the restricted import demand is less than the quantity of hot air. The clearing price for permits will not be well defined at this point since permits have great value to importers but the supply available at zero cost exceeds demand. In keeping with the assumption of price-taking behavior, we assume a price of epsilon (equal to one dollar per megaton (MT)) to cover transaction costs and to clear the market for the permits that can be exported. AtÊthis point, the free market value of the hot air has been entirely transferred to the importers and all the remaining deadweight loss occurs on the importer side. The term dp in equation (1) becomes zero, and there are no further income transfers to mitigate the costs incurred by importers as the restriction is tightened further.
The explanation of monopsonistic effects presented above can be made more concrete by solving for the prices and quantities that clear the permit market. To do this we employ a set of marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves, a prediction of business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, and a set of Kyoto commitments for aggregate Annex B regions. The technique of solving for the market equilibrium using MAC curves is described in Appendix A4. The MAC curves are generated for the year 2010 from runs of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model version 3.0, as explained in .
7 EPPA is a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium simulation of global economic activity, energy production and use, and carbon emissions (Babiker et al., in preparation) . It divides the world into 12 regional economies, each represented by eight production sectors and inter-linked by trade in energy and non-energy commodities. EPPA also predicts emissions of non-CO 2 greenhouse gases, but these are omitted from this analysis in order to maintain the transparency of the central results. 8 exporter MACs were equal, then the total global deadweight loss would be twice the sum of the exporter triangles corresponding to CEF. If some importers are unrestricted, the importer deadweight loss will be greater since the lower price will induce unrestricted importers to take up some of the restricted demand. In fact, the slopes of the MACs are not greatly different, as indicated by the values for the parameter b in the next footnote. 7 The MACs are constructed by imposing progressively stringent proportional constraints on carbon emissions in Annex B regions, and by using a least-squares procedure to fit a constant elasticity function to the model results in price-abatement space. The approximations take the form mc a The prediction of BAU carbon emissions is taken from the reference scenario in EPPA 3.0 and the cost implications of the Kyoto commitments using the EPPA-generated MACs and BAU emissions are given in Table 1 . The EPPA reference scenario is a relatively high emissions forecast, which results in greater abatement and higher costs than some others. The recently published reference forecast in the 1999 International Energy Outlook (hereafter, IEO99) published by the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy (USDOE,Ê1999) is also included in Table 1 Several points that emerge from the comparison of these two forecasts should be kept in mind in an analysis of supplementarity. First, relatively small changes in predicted emissions can have large effects on partiesÕ abatement requirements and the characteristics of an emissions trading market. Annex B emissions are only 9% less in the IEO99 forecast than in the EPPA 3.0 reference case (4.34 GT vs. 4.76 GT), but the amount of abatement required to meet the Kyoto commitments is half as much (0.45 GT vs. 0.87 GT) and the costs are less by the same proportion or more. Since the ceiling is fixed, the difference between the forecasts is fully reflected in the amount of required abatement, which is the primary determinant of cost. Second, since lower growth implies less required abatement, lower permit prices, and greater reliance on imported permits, the probability that any given concrete ceiling would be binding increases with lower growth forecasts. Third, assumptions about the growth in emissions have a much greater effect on total costs when trading is assumed than otherwise. For instance, when no trading is assumed, total Annex B costs are about half as much with the lower growth IEO99 forecast than with the higher growth EPPA reference case. When unrestricted trading is assumed, total costs in the low growth forecast are one-sixth the amount of the higher growth case. Trading makes hot air available and there is more of it when exportersÕ emissions grow slowly.
Finally, it should be noted that both of these forecasts agree on one new feature that reflects emissions growth since 1990. Earlier analyses typically showed that Japan would face considerably higher marginal cost of abatement without trading than other Annex B regions, and therefore that it would be the party gaining the most from emissions trading, as well as from certain levels of restriction. The US now occupies that position, or shares it with Japan depending on the forecast, due to the greater rate of economic and emissions growth during the 1990s in the US compared to Japan, the EU or most other OECD countries.
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Figure 4 uses the curves first developed by Criqui et al. (1999) to show the effect on total cost of the Kyoto reduction as the import restriction moves from none at all to complete prohibition. For ease of analysis and exposition, we define the ceiling as the minimum percent of domestic abatement required. This percent ranges from 0% representing no restriction (free trade) to 100% representing an absolute prohibition on international permit trading (autarky). Thus, a limitation restricting permit imports to no more than 25% of the required abatement can be expressed equivalently as a requirement to abate at least 75% domestically. In Figure 4 , the total cost of the Kyoto reduction associated with given levels of restriction is expressed relative to the total cost under free trade, or in the case of the exporting regions, the total benefit with free trade. For importers, the consequences of a concrete ceiling fall into one of three categories. The first includes levels of restriction that would not bind on any importing region, such as, in the EPPA 3.0 reference forecast, a ceiling requiring up to 53% domestic abatement (prohibiting imports of more than 47% of the total requirement). Any concrete ceiling within this interval will have no effect on costs since all importing parties would be abating at least this much domestically. The second category contains all levels of restriction that result in lower total cost for importers than that associated with free trade. This second subset will be least inclusive for the importer facing the highest autarkic marginal cost and the most inclusive for the importer with the lowest autarkic marginal cost. For instance, using the EPPA 3.0 reference forecast, this range begins at 53% required domestic abatement for all parties, but ends at 84% for the US and at 90% for the OOE. The third subset includes all levels of restriction that increase importersÕ total cost above that associated with free trade. This subset is the complement to the second, and it runs from 84% to 100% for the US and from 90% to 100% for the OOE.
The experience of the exporting regions is the same as that for importing parties over the first intervalÑno effectÑbut it is quite different as soon as the first importing party is actually restricted. Thereafter, the benefits associated with free trade are diminished continually until the point is reached, in this case when 80% domestic abatement is required, at which the demand for imports is less than the available hot air. At this point, exporters undertake no abatement, and, with price-taking behavior, they are assumed to sell whatever hot air is demanded for a token sum of one dollar per MT.
The reduction in the gains from trade from import restriction and the distribution of those gains are illustrated on Figure 5 , which plots the aggregate gains by importers (the four OECD regions) and exporters (FSU and EET) along the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. The point labeled free trade identifies the maximum gains from trade and the distribution of those gains resulting from the Kyoto allocation of assigned allowable amounts (AAUs) and the EPPA 3.0 reference forecast. The dashed line passing through the free trade point is the emissions trading equivalent of a budget line representing all possible allocations of the maximum gains from free trade between importers and exporters.
10 Any point lying between this line and the origin indicates a loss of efficiency, which can be measured by the perpendicular distance from that line. The 45° line indicates all points at which the gains from trade are evenly split between 10 Given the EPPA 3.0 reference forecast and the assumption of competitive market structure, any other point on this line could be attained by a redistribution of assigned amounts between importers and exporters in what is a simple illustration of the Coasian Theorem applied to GHG emissions trading. For instance, if the allocation of AAUs agreed to at Kyoto resulted in greater allocations to the OECD economies and commensurately fewer to the FSU and Eastern Europe, the free trade point would have been moved to the right along this line, and vice versa. importers and exporters, which is used here to depict equity. Equity is of course a notoriously hard concept to quantify and we do not wish to suggest that an equal distribution of the gains from trade among importers and exporters is anything more than a heuristic concept of equity. Nevertheless, any more appropriate definition of equity would allocate the gains between importers and exporters in a manner that could be plotted in this space. Departures from this line would then provide a measure of the equity effects of the restriction. The curve in Figure 5 indicates the effect of an increasingly more stringent, uniform import restriction on the aggregate gains from trade and the distribution of those gains between importers and exporters. The free trade point prevails for any uniform restriction mandating up to 53% domestic abatement. Restrictions of 55% and 60% domestic abatement result in little loss of efficiency, but the gains from trade are increasingly redistributed in favor of importers. The maximum gain for importersÑand their least cost of complying with the Kyoto ProtocolÑwill be achieved with a limit requiring 70% domestic abatement. Even tighter restrictions on importers move the locus of gains back towards the origin and eventually to the loss of all gains from emissions trading, which is the definition of autarky. The vertical line XX separates the curve into ranges for which importers gain (to the right) or lose (to the left) relative to free-trade. In this case, aggregate importer gains are possible over a wide range of restriction, from 53% to slightly over 85% required domestic abatement.
The specific results shown in Figures 4 and 5 reflect the particular forecast used and the allocation of AAUs in the Kyoto Protocol. Different forecasts and allocations would lead to a different free trade equilibrium point, which may be closer or farther from the origin and closer to one axis or the other than depicted in Figure 5 . Also, depending on the forecast and the allocation, the point at which a concrete ceiling would bind would be higher or lower. What should be clear, however, is that, as soon as the import restriction binds, the monopsonistic effects shown in Figures 4 and 5 will appear. A restriction on imports can reduce the total costs for importers over a considerable interval of restriction because of the monopsonistic redistribution of the (reduced) gains of trade that is inherent in a restriction on demand.
THE EU PROPOSAL ON SUPPLEMENTARITY
At the June 1999 meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies, the EU advanced a specific proposal to implement the supplemental provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.
11 This proposal is considerably more complicated than the single uniform limit used in the preceding section and in other analyses of supplementarity. Therefore, we quote it in full.
ÒNet acquisitions by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto mechanisms together must not exceed the higher of the following alternatives:
¥ 5% of its baseline emissions multiplied by five and its assigned amount (over five years) divided by two, or ¥ 50% of the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year of the period from 1994 to 2002, multiplied by five, and its assigned amount.
ÒNet transfers by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto mechanisms together must not exceed:
¥ 5% of its baseline emissions multiplied by five and its assigned amount divided by two.
ÒHowever, the ceiling on net acquisitions and on net transfers can be increased to the extent that an Annex B Party achieves emission reductions larger than the relevant ceiling in the commitment period through domestic action undertaken after 1993, if demonstrated by the Party in a verifiable manner and subject to the expert review process to be developed under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.Ó There are three distinct components: a restriction on imports, a restriction on exports, and the however clause. The last two have a significant effect on the monopsonistic consequences of supplementarity.
The conventional import component of the EU proposal would limit a partyÕs imports of tradable permits during the first commitment period to no more than the greater of the two formula quantities. These formulae may appear complicated, but they are a reasonable attempt to deal with an inherent problem in implementing an import restriction. Analysts typically model a restriction as a percent of the reduction required by the Kyoto Protocol, but the counterfactual emissions implicit in such a formulation are never observed. The EU proposal avoids this problem by referring to quantities already agreed upon or to emissions that will be observed before the proposed restriction becomes applicable. For any given forecast, such as the EPPA 3.0 reference case, the EU limits for both imports and exports can be readily calculated and converted to percentages of the required emission reduction in 2010, as shown in Table 2 . The EU import limit would not be uniform among parties, as assumed in Figures 4 and 5 , but would vary depending on growth of emissions since 1990. Using the EPPA 3.0 reference forecast, domestic abatement would be required for 72Ð77% of an importing partyÕs reduction requirement, or equivalently, imports would be limited to 23% to 28% of the requirement. The export component of the EU proposal would limit a partyÕs permit exports to the first of the two formulae applying to imports, or to a total of 66 MT of carbon. Restricting permit exports as a means of implementing supplementarity is a novel interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol, but it does reflect a concern often expressed about the export of hot air. Moreover, it might be argued that an export limit provides an indirect way of implementing supplementarity since the higher market price associated with restricted exports of hot air reduces permit imports from what they would be otherwise. 12 The proposed export limit also effectively redefines the assigned amounts for would-be exporters in the Kyoto Protocol, at least to the extent that they or others anticipated trading hot air in the first commitment period in excess of the proposed limit.
The however clause raises the proposed ceilings on both imports and exports to the extent that an Annex B party undertakes verifiable domestic abatement. An importing party can exceed the formula quantities to the extent it can demonstrate domestic abatement greater than that amount. Thus, the clause effectively raises the import ceiling, and reduces the domestic abatement requirement, to 50% of the emission reduction requirement. By implication, a party importing more than the formula amount but meeting less than 50% of its requirement by domestic abatement would receive credit for imports equal only to the level of domestic abatement. For instance, a party otherwise in compliance that had imported permits to cover emissions 60 MT over the Kyoto limit but that could demonstrate only 40 MT of domestic abatement, would presumably be judged 20 MT short of its commitment.
On the export side, the however clause operates in a similar manner. Annex B parties could export more than the formula amount if verifiable domestic abatement by the exporting party can beÊdemonstrated. Assuming that hot air can be distinguished from real abatement, unconstrained parties would be limited to exporting only the formula amount of hot air, but they would not otherwise be restricted. Constrained parties (those with no hot air), which might export due to low marginal cost, would be protected up to the formula amount from challenges based on additionality, but for exports in excess of the formula amount, verifiable abatement would need to be shown.
The loosening effect of the however clause is entirely dependent on the possibility of proving that abatement is real. If verifiable abatement could be demonstrated with relatively little cost, the however clause would operate as intended: to relax the otherwise very restrictive formula limits on emissions trading. Such is its effect in the first-best world of model simulations in which all abatement is real and trading is frictionless; however, in a less perfect worldÑwhere the counterfactual emissions required to establish verifiable reductions can never be definitively provenÑthe added test invites mischief that would frustrate the intent of the clause. Importers who would use the clause will find themselves embroiled with their challengers in an ultimately irresolvable duel of competing model projections concerning what domestic emissions would have been had no domestic actions been undertaken to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Exporters who would take advantage of the however clause will find themselves in the same dilemma for the distinction between hot air and real abatement depends similarly on establishing what exporter emissions would have been without any abatement in response to the Kyoto Protocol. At best, the added test needlessly increases transaction costs; at worst, it will prove theÊhowever clauseÕs promise of relief to be illusory.
The several components of the EU proposal have a large effect on the efficiency and equity aspects of the distribution of the gains from emissions trading. Four points on Figure 6 can be used to illustrate the effects of the import and export limits alone and of the however clause. TheÊtwo points labeled Òw/o however clauseÓ indicate the division of the gains between exporters and importers when either the import or export limit is applied. The import limit diminishes the global gains from trade by about 20% relative to the unfettered market equilibrium, but the income transfer is such that, from the standpoint of the importers, a nearly optimal monopsonistic restriction is achieved. The export limit without the however clause would restrict the supply of cheap abatement from the non-constrained Annex B parties to 66ÊMT, but that small amount is sold at a very high price: high enough in this case to cause two of the constrained Annex B regions to become small exporters. The two non-constrained regions, the FSU and eastern Europe, are better off than with the import limit, but the importers are much worse off, and nearly all the potential gains from emissions trading have been given up.
When the however clause is present and operating as intended, it moves both of these points toward the free trade equilibrium. In the EPPA 3.0 reference case with the import limit, no importing party would be restricted when the however clause operates since all constrained parties would abate at least 50% of their emission reduction requirements domestically. As a result, the point representing the import limit with the however clause is the same as that for the free trade equilibrium. When the export limit applies, the however clause allows exporting parties to sell as much real abatement as importers are willing to buy. All parties gain from the relaxation of the export limit, as shown by the point labeled Òexport limit with however clause.Ó In fact, this point represents the efficiency and equity implications of the full EU proposal (bothÊlimits with however clause operating) when it is applied in an Annex B market. In this instance, only the export limit is binding since the clearing price is high enough to cause all importing regions to abate more than 50% of their emission reduction requirement domestically. Compared to free trade, the proposal reduces total surplus by about 28% to $50 billion, roughly 60% of which would accrue to exporters.
The four outcomes illustrated by Figure 6 depend greatly in magnitude and exact location upon the BAU emissions prediction, but the relative positions shown here will hold for all reasonably plausible forecasts of Annex B emissions during the first commitment period. For instance, in the IEO99 forecast, some parties import more than 50% of the reduction requirement with free trade so that the import limit with the however clause would not coincide with the free trade equilibrium using this forecast. In general, when the EU import limit binds, the locus of gains is moved to the southeast into the region showing monopsonistic effects, and when the EU export limit binds, the locus is moved mostly toward the origin. For both limits, the however clause operates to place these points nearer, or even at, the free trade equilibrium.
The point representing the full EU proposal (export limit with however clause) can be usefully compared to the three points within the oval on Figure 6 , which represent solutions in which the FSU is assumed no longer to be a price taker but to exercise its potential for monopoly power. Each dot within the oval reflects a different assumption about importer behavior: no restriction, the EU limit on imports without the however clause, and the EU limit on exports with the however clause. 13 The exercise of monopoly power by the largest supplier always entails a loss of efficiency, but the principal effect is to redistribute the gains from buyers to sellers, as can be seen by comparing each point to the corresponding position where the FSU is assumed to be a price taker.
14 Although suppliers can always gain by exploiting market power, if they are unable to do so, the proposed EU export limit approximates the result by providing the requisite mechanism for restricting supply. By so doing, the EU export limit succeeds in transforming the unwelcome invitation to monopsony into a self-abnegating invitation to monopoly, at least in an Annex B market.
15 But this monopolistic result depends critically on whether the however clause works as intended. If it does not the export limit will still be the binding constraint, and whether the FSU is a price taker or monopolist will be a moot point, for any exports beyond this limit will be open to question based on exportersÕ counterfactual emissions. In this case, the outcome will be the point closest to the origin where there is little trading, and little gain for anyone.
CONCLUSION
The title to this paper indicates the conclusion. The supplementarity condition in the Kyoto Protocol is an invitation to the exercise of monopsonistic power, whether intended or not. Monopsonistic effects require only that demand be restricted, not that the restriction be optimal in any sense. Also, these effects occur with price-taking behavior by both buyers and sellers so long as an effective coordinating or restraining mechanism is in place. A concrete ceiling on permit imports provides such a mechanism, and with it, all buyers will be better off over some range of restriction, although most assuredly there is a point beyond which further restriction results in higher costs for importers than under free trade. Thus, the unexpected results noted by many analysts are not accidental features of import restriction, but unavoidable consequences.
The EU proposal avoids the monopsonistic effects that are addressed in this paper, but it does so only by calling into question the basic elements of the agreement among the parties at Kyoto. Emissions trading and hot air were included in the Kyoto Protocol to lower the costs of the emissions reductions sufficiently to gain agreement and encourage parties to take the first steps toward averting the threat of dangerous climate change. Supplementarity was also included, raising the questionÑat least implicitlyÑof what was agreed upon. This provision can be interpreted as stating the obvious about the necessarily supplemental nature of imported permits in any serious implementation of Kyoto. Unfortunately, and as if to illustrate the proposition that seemingly innocuous provisions are rarely such, the EU proposal goes well beyond the simple, relatively non-binding restriction that might have been imagined. The export limit effectively vitiates whatever role the excess AAUs were intended to have. And setting aside hot air, the beneficial effects of emissions trading for both importers and exporters depend entirely on the workability of the however clause, which hinges on yet another seemingly innocuous provision, that verifiable abatement be shown. One might understandably question whether there was any agreement on emissions trading and hot air at Kyoto.
The EU proposal on supplementarity is a well-intentioned and in many ways clever interpretation of this worryingly vague provision of the Kyoto Protocol, but it is also illustrates how good intentions and bad assumptions can make things worse. The good intention is the very goal of the Kyoto Protocol: that parties undertake real abatement. The bad assumption is that emissions trading could lead a party to avoid undertaking any real abatement at all. It is hard to imagine how this latter circumstance could occur, other than by permits that are fraudulent, in which case the problem is fundamental and more severe than can be addressed by restrictions on emissions trading. In the end, the appropriate distribution of emissions reductions achieved domestically versus abroad and now versus later (e.g., hot air) is a decidedly secondary concern to the more important issue of creating the monitoring and accounting mechanisms to ensure that all traded permits are excess to the issuing countryÕs needs. In focusing on such concerns, and in introducing equally worrisome distinctions, the EU proposal threatens to become a distracting side-show from the main event, which is to build a workable and effective international structure to encourage parties to undertake actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
APPENDIX
In region j the domestic supply price p j of a quantity of abatement a j is determined by its marginal abatement curve f j (a j ). We assume that each function f passes through the origin, is invertible, strictly increasing in abatement, and possesses a non-negative second derivative. Every region faces an emissions reduction commitment k j and may be endowed with surplus permits h j representing hot air.
A1
. Import restrictions generate a fall in the permit price in the presence of competitive supply:
With emissions trading, jÕs net imports of emissions-reduction credits m j are defined by the market clearance condition
and the aggregate excess demand for permits by
Let the set of j regions in the market be partitioned into i importers and e exporters. Assuming constancy of partiesÕ commitments and endowments of hot air, we can split equation (3) into an aggregate demand function
and an aggregate supply function 
Import restrictions imply that dm i < 0. We assume that sellers adjust their output for the market to clear. Using the sign convention that m i < 0 and m e > 0, this implies å e dm e = Ðå i dm i > 0.
With restricted trade, let p RT be the price at which the marginal cost of abatement is equalized across exporters, such that the market clears. Linear additivity of abatement allows us to define a function A e of the price, so that we can rewrite equation (5) å e dm e = Ð A e ¢ dp RT .
The fact that the functions f e Ð1 are strictly increasing means that A e ¢ > 0, implying that dp RT < 0.
A3.
With restricted trade, internal deadweight loss increases with domestic abatement, savings from permit imports achieve a maximum, and total abatement costs achieve a minimum:
With reference to Figure 2 , a restricted party r suffers a deadweight loss ABC given by
where p FT and a FT are, respectively, the permit price and level of domestic abatement under free trade. This increment to cost is offset by the gross savings on permit imports CDEF given by
Differentiating these expressions yields first-order conditionŝ
The interpretation of these formulae is straightforward. First, the internal deadweight loss DWL r is minimized at the free-trade level of imports ˆ a r = a FT . To see this, note that the second derivative of (7) Combined with the fact the derivative of DWL r is f r -p FT > 0, this condition implies the that deadweight loss is increasing and convex in a r . This is shown by the thin solid line in Figure 3 . Second, the gross savings on imports S r are maximized at a level of restriction ˜ a r . By equation (6) p′ < 0, implying that ˜ a r ∈(a FT ,k r ). Sufficient conditions for savings to be maximized can be found from the second derivative of (8):
where p″ is simply the derivative of equation (6). A negative value of this expression indicates that S r achieves a maximum. From A2 we know that 
